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Most likely it will not be accepted in cases where de-
fendant is indicted for a felony because Commonwealth v.
Buck'6 is not authority and dictum in Commonwealth v.
Shrope" decides it is improper.
It seems it is allowable where defendant is charged
with a misdemeanor, although the punishment may be fine
or imprisonment or both.'8
Surely it may be pleaded in Pennsylvania where the
defendant is charged with a light misdemeanor punishable
only by a fine. 19
A defendant may not plead nolo contendere to an in-
dictment for statutory rape.20 Is the conclusion of the court
correct? It is based only on the dictum contained in the
Shrope case. Why should any distinction be made as to the
propriety of this plea where the indictment charges a felony
and where it charges a misdemeanor? The criterion seems
to be the magnitude or severity of the punishment, not the
degree of the crime. Since it is true that convictions for
misdemeanors sometimes carry with them greater punish-
ments than convictions for felonies, it ought to follow as
a matter of logic, that this plea is proper regardless of
whether the indictment charges a felony or a misdemeanor
so long as the punishment is not capital, since the plea has




VIOLATION OF A STATUTE OR ORDINANCE AS
EVIDENCE OF NEGLIGENCE
Today, more and more, we find that legislatures are
enacting statutes defining duties which at common law
16107 Pa. (1884).
17264 Pa. 246 (1919).
lsCommonwealth v. Holstine, 132 Pa. 357 (1890).
'gCommonwealth v. Shrope, 264 Pa. 246 (1919; Tucker v. U. S., 41
L. R. A. (N.S.) 70.
20Commonwealth v. McGowan, 12 D. & C. 286.
"'Commonwealth v. Holstine, 132 Pa. 357 (1890).
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were not so defined but left to be determined under the
general rules of negligence. An attempt is made herein
to examine representative cases to determine the effect
which the courts are giving these statutes.
There are, in general, two ways of construing the
violation of statutes in negligence cases. The first and
strictest rule is that of negligence per se. The other is con-
struing the violation of the statute as mere evidence of, or
some evidence of negligence.
Negligence Per Se
Before starting to examine the cases, it would be well
to have some common ground of understanding on the
question as to just what is negligence per se. Like most
of our abstract doctrines at law, we cannot hope to make
one which will fit every situation. 20 RCL sec. 33 defines
negligence per se in this manner:
"The principle comprehensively stated is that
where a statute or a municipal ordinance imposes upon
any person a specific duty for the protection or benefit
of others, if he neglects to perform that duty, he is
liable to those for whose protection or benefit it was
imposed for any injuries of the character which
the statute or ordinance was designed to prevent and
which were proximately produced by such neglect."
Also in Platt v. The Southern Photo Material Co.'
"So long as duties remain undefined, or defined
only in abstract terms, a breach is not properly defined
as negligence per se; but when any special act or
dereliction is wrong universally so as to be subject to
the attention of legislative power and it is expressly
prohibited by law, any violation, a doing of this for-
bidden specific act is correctly called negligence per
se."1
Negligence per se is a matter of law. There is no
question of fact and as such it is subject to judicial rather
than jury determination. That is, of course, where there
is a proved violation. Ordinary negligence has two com-
14 Georgia 159; 60 S.E. 1068.
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ponent parts: a duty and a violation. In negligence per se,
so called, the duty as such is by preceding thought and en-
actment laid down definitely and concretely. It seems then
that it is the duty which is per se. Consider a statute mak-
ing it unlawful to operate a motor vehicle over thirty-five
miles per hour in a given territory. Concede a violation of
this statute as a result of which an injury is caused and
we say it is negligence per se. It is not the negligence
which the legislature had laid down, it is the duty. Per se
then is more properly attached to duty.
Penal Statutes Exclusive
In Westervelt v. Dives2 the court held that when a
statute creates a new duty and provides for a fine, the pre-
sumption is that such money payment is exclusive but if a
plain duty is imposed for the benefit of an individual, and
the penalty is obviously inadequate to compel performance,
the implication will be strong, if not conclusive, that the
penalty was meant to be cumulative to such remedy as the
law gives when a duty owing to an individual is neglected.
A penal statute in Pennsylvania has been held exclusive of
any other remedy than that provided. The Act of May 11,
1893, P.L. 41 requires building contractors to cover the
joists or girders of each floor above the third story with
board or other suitable material so as to protect workmen
and others. The case of Mack v. Wright' held that:
"The money penalty provided by the act is exclus-
ive of all other remedies and an action for damages for
personal injuries cannot be sustained for failure to
comply with the general provisions of the act."
In the Westervelt case the Act of May 30, 1895, P.L. 129
prescribed that automatic locking devices on elevators must
be attached. The court in construing the act held it was
not exclusive in its penalty but that a person injured by




a civil action for damages. In McElhone v. Phila. Quartette
Club,' the court said:
"The fact that the act of May 2, 1905, P.L. 352 is
penal in character and that violations of its provisions
are punishable by fine or imprisonment does not ren-
der such remedies exclusive and does not supersede
the right of action for damages in a civil proceed-
ing."
That the Mack case is in conflict with the latter three
cases is obvious and recognized as such by our Supreme
Court. Although not dealing with the question, the Su-
preme Court admits in Commonwealth v. Wilkins:'
"It is not necessary to consider under what cir-
cumstances a private party may maintain an action to
recover damages for injuries resulting from a breach
by the defendant of a statutory duty, when the act pre-
scribing it provides for a penalty for its violation, but
does not expressly declare the party injured may sue
because thereof. Perhaps our cases on this point are
not wholly reconcilable, at least if full weight is to be
given to the dicta therein. '"'
The conclusion seems to be that in all cases we must
first look at the words of the statute itself to determine
whether or not the statutory penalty is to be held to be
exclusive. It is suggested that the Mack case was decided
many years before the latter cases holding contra and the
same result would not be reached today, Apparently
from reading the statute itself, there can be no accounting
for the difference in the result attained as the statute cer-
tainly would be applicable in a civil suit if the general pur-
pose doctrine were the test. It was for the protection of
workmen and others.
453 Pa. Super. Ct. 262.
5271 Pa. 528.
eCiting Mack v. Wright, 180 Pa. 472; Stehle v. Jaeger Mach. Co.,
220 Pa. 617; Westervelt v. Dives, 231 Pa. 548; Bryuelson v. Turner-
Forman Concrete Steel Co., 239 Pa. 346; Danner v. Wells, 248 Pa. 105.
See also Christner v. Coal Co., 146 Pa. 67
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Cases and Statutes
1. Statutes on Negligence
Under some Pennsylvania statutes the violation is
made negligence per se and as such there is no room for
construction. The act of 1891, P.L. 176, Article XI, section
3 reads as follows:
"A failure to comply with the provisions of this
article shall be deemed an offense against this act, and
shall be taken to be negligence per se on the part of
the owner, operator, superintendent or mine foreman,
as the case may be, * * * * "7
The same might be said as to the provision in the Motor
Vehicle Code when the owner permits an infant under the
age of 16 years to drive his machine.
2. Selling Firearms
In the cases under the act of June 10, 1881, P.L. 111 im-
posing on fire-arm merchants a duty not to sell to a minor
under 16 years it has been held that a violation would sub-
ject such a merchant to liability "for any natural or prob-
able harmful result which might follow in the wake of his
wrongful act."s Going further, they have held that an
ordinary discharge is the natural and probable conse-
quence.0 Thus, taken together, the holdings can only rep-
resent negligence per se. In Wassel v. Ludwig'0 the
minor's negligence was held immaterial. That case ex-
pressed approval of the two preceding cases. However,
the facts disclose that the" injury was not caused by the
minor who purchased, but by the discharge by one of his
playmates. The question of negligence could not be stated
as negligence per se and the non-suit was taken off to sub-
mit the question to the jury. In these cases, (notes 8 and
9) the existence of negligence as a foundation was not
questioned and they probably represent true holding of
lCollins v. Northern Anthracite Coal Co., 241 Pa. 55; Kolalsky v.
Dela. & H. R. Co., 260 Pa 357.
8Shaffer v. Mowry, 265 Pa. 300.
eMcMullin v. Stehle, 275 Pa. 584.
1092 Pa. Super. Ct. 341.
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negligence per se. Whether there was a violation of the
statute of course, can be questioned."
3. Child Labor Cases
Section 1 of the Act of April 29, 1909, P.L. 283 pro-
hibits the employment of any minor under the age of 18
years in any factory except under certain conditions speci-
fied in the act. Section 7 of the same act forbids employ-
ment of minors under 16 unless there is a record on file, ac-
cessible to the factory deputy inspector, an employment
certificate and unless the employer also keeps two lists of
all minors under 16, one on file in the office and one con-
spicuously posted in each of several departments where the
minors work. This language was held to be mandatory in
Chabot v. Pitts. P. Glass Co.12 and failure to comply is neglig-
ence for which the defendant is liable. It further states:
"Law refers the injury sustained by the employee to the
original wrong as its proximate cause." The provision was
mandatory and as such prerequisite to any legal employ-
ment. The employer had failed to post the list and to per-
mit recovery seems a bit harsh since from the facts the
posting violation was not the proximate cause of his in-
jury. The authorities are collected in Johnson v. Endura
Mfg. Co.13 That case was decided under the Child Labor
Act of 1915, P. L. 286. There the court said:
"It is true that if the original employment of the
minor is expressly prohibited and as a result of such
employment his presence upon the premises where the
accident occurred is thus occasioned, the owner will be
responsible, for the illegal hiring will be deemed the
proximate cause. This has been held under statutes
similar to the one now under construction, where the
plaintiff was under the lawful age of 14 years."1
The same result can be found as to an illegal employ-
I"Pierson v. London, 156 Atl. 719 at 721.
12259 Pa. 504.
13282 Pa. 322.
'4Citing Krutlies v. Bulls Head Coal Co., 249 Pa. 162; Faibla v.
Calderone, 275 Pa. 303; Stehle v. Jaeger Mach. Co., 225 Pa. 348.
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merit under the Mine Act of June 15, 1911, P.L. 983. It was
held in Telinko v. Pitt. Coal Co.,'15 that:
"As we view the legislation, its purpose was to
make unlawful the hiring of one within the prohibited
age, where the main purpose was to perform some ex-
tra hazardous work as therein defined but to permit it
in other cases."
In Riley v. Pittston Coal Co.,' 6 where the employment
was lawful under Sec. 8, Article V of the Act of June 21,
1891, P.L. 176 the result was different as no statutory duty
was applicable. In Lenahan v. Pittston Coal Co.,17 it was held
that contributory negligence or assumption of risk was no
defense when the action is founded on the violation of a
statute by employing a minor in a hazardous employment.
In view of the holding in these cases there seems to be
no justification for the decision of Belles v. Jackson'8 where
it was held that though the employment was unlawful still
it must be the proximate cause of the injury. Ermentrout,
P. J. said:
"The illegal employment, therefore, does not per
se constitute negligence. Such employment must be
the direct or proximate cause of the injury complained
of, and this must be determined in accordance with the
general rule."
Here the employment was of a minor of 12 years of
age in violation of the Act of May 20, 1889, P.L. 243. The
case has never been cited and seems to have been impliedly
overruled.
A rapid reading of Stehle v. Jaeger Mach. Co., 9 would
leave the same impression as Belles v. Jackson but the case
was really at issue on the question of violation of a labor
act. The fact submitted to the jury was not whether the
employment was the cause of the injury but whether the
employment was prohibited by law.
1568 Pa. Super Ct. 143
16224 Pa. 633.
17218 Pa. 311.
184 Dist. Ct. 194.
1225 Pa. 348.
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4. Safety Regulations Generally
Under statutes defining duties as to the condition of
premises, such as to guard a shaft, the violation is treated
as negligence per se although our Pennsylvania courts seem
to be adverse to the use of that term. In Drake v. Fenton2"
it was held that a failure to guard a shaft is a neglect of
a statutory duty against which nothing but contributory
negligence will relieve. A case often cited on the question
of negligence arising from the violation of a statutory
duty is Beach v. Hyman.2 1 The plaintiff relied on the Act
of 1903, P.L. 304 to show liability:
".. . Such guards on enclosure gates shall be kept
closed at all times when not in actual use and trap
doors shall be closed at the close of business each day,
by the occupant or occupants of the building having
the use or control of the same."
The case was decided, however, on the ground that the
defendant had not violated the act, and if so, that the in-
jury was not the proximate cause of the violation. The
case therefore establishes nothing as to the existence of a
duty created by statute. The employer had supplied the
guards but a workman had evidently allowed them to re-
main open. The defendant was not liable since the open
guard was a mere transitory danger. The defendant was
not required to follow and observe the details of each man's
work. However, it was said that the binding authority of
Drake v. Fenton 2 is not to be questioned but it is not to be
overlooked that it is conditioned not only on the negligence
of the occupant of the building but on neglect which was
the proximate cause of the accident. 8 Probably the strong-
est language is found in Bollinger v. Crystal Sand Co.,2' de-
cided under the Act of May 2, 1905, section 11, P.L. 352,
20237 Pa. 8; 32 Anm. Cas. 1914 B 517.
21254 Pa. 131.
22237 Pa. 8; 32 Ann. Cas. 1914 B 517.
28Citing Jones v. Amer. Caramel Co., 225 Pa. 644; Valjago v.




where it is said that a statute is a legislative mandate and
disregard is negligence rendering everyone guilty of it re-
sponsible for the consequences resulting directly and solely
from it. Under Drake v. Fenton25 construing an act on
elevator guards it was said that the act was passed under
the police power for the benefit of all persons lawfully on
the premises and as to them it created a duty the breach of
which was actionable negligence.
In Jaras v. Wright2l the court decided that there was
no legal excuse for a failure to obey an absolute statutory
requirement. The statute was the Act of June 9, 1911, P.
L- 798 regulating "electric haulage by locomotives operated
from a trolley wire . . . in any gaseous portions of mines
except upon intake air, fresh from the outside."
The lower courts followed the Supreme Court in
Fry v. Brubaker27 under the Act of March 25, 1903 P.L. 54.21
5. Traffic Regulations
Under statutes concerning road law the courts apply
the same rule of negligence per se for a violation when the
duty is definitely fixed within absolute limits. 20 The lan-
guage used is much the same as has been quoted in the
above section. The violation of the statutory duty is
negligence per se but it must be the proximate cause.
In all the cases except those under the selling of fire
arms' statutes and those under statutes dealing with
25237 Pa. 8; 32 Ann. Cas. 1914 B 517.
26263 Pa. 486.
2777 Pa. Super. Ct. 438.
2SCiting Drake v. Fenton, 237 Pa. 8, and Beach v. Hyman, 254 Pa.
131. Also see Neagley v. Cassone, 10 D. & C. 632 construing differ-
ent acts.
29Lane v. E. A. Mullen, Inc., 285 Pa. 161 and Community Fire Co.,
v. Pa. Power and Light; 92 Pa. Super. Ct. 304. But it must be the
efficient cause-failure to comply with license law did not bar re-
covery as contributory negligence-Yeager v. Winton Motor Car
Co., 53 Pa. Super. Ct. 202; McIlhenny v. Baker, 63 Pa. Super. Ct.
385; Preston v. Pilch, 2 D. & C. 180. See also Clamper v. Phila.
279 Pa. 385. As to negligence per se attaching to a definite duty, see
Zanduras v Moffet, 286 Pa. 477; Hayes v. Schomaker, 302 Pa. 72 at
77; Piper v. Adams Express Co., 27 Pa. 54; which is the meaning of
the dictum in Johnson v. Amer. Reduction Co., 158 Ati. 153.
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child employment in dangerous occupations, the viola-
tion must be proven to be the proximate cause of
the injury. In the excepted examples not only was
the negligence per se but the result was per se proxi-
mately caused by the violation. Contributory negligence
will bar a recovery even when the defendant has violated
a statute, but the exception noted in the fire-arm and em-
ployment statutes is true here also.
In no case is the doctrine of assumption of risk avail-
able as a defense. 0
Ordinances
Under ordinances the courts have applied a different
rule and even though the duty is well defined the violation
is treated as mere evidence of, or some evidence of neglig-
ence, to be considered with the other facts to ascertain
whether or not the defendant is guilty of negligence.8' As
was said in Uhelman v. American Ice Co.,82
"Ordinances and their violation are admissible not
as substantive and sufficient proof of negligence of the
defendant, but as evidence of municipal expression of
opinion, on the matter as to which the municipal au-
thorities have acted."
8°Riley v. Pittston Coal Co., 224 Pa. 633; Amiano v. Jones &
Laughlin Co., 233 Pa. 524; Jones v. American Caramel Co., 225 Pa.
644; Valjago v. Carnegie Steel Co., 226 Pa. 514; Smith v. Stoner, 243
Pa. 57; Dobra v. Lehigh Valley Coal Co., 250 Pa. 313.
31Uhelman v. American Ice Co., 209 Pa. 398; Lederman v. P. R.
T. Co., 165 Pa. 118; Foote v. Amer. Products Co.., 195 Pa. 190;
Weinschenck v. Phila. Homemade Bread Co., 258 Pa. 99; Fane v.
P. R. T. Co., 228 Pa. 471; Pa. R. R. Co., v. James, 811/2 Pa. 194;
Connor v. Elect. Traction Co., 173 Pa. 602; Shaeffer v. Roesch, 215
Pa. 287; Ed. Davidson v. Schuylkill, 4 Pa. Super. Ct. 86; Bill v.
Jacobs, 261 Pa. 204; Murphy v. P. R. T. Co., 285 Pa. 399; Hibberd
v. Phila., 245 Pa. 265; Herron v. Pittsburgh, 204 Pa. 509; Rigert v.
Thackery, 212 Pa. 86; Reading R. R. Co. v. Ervin, 89 Pa. 71; Pitts. v.
Grier, 22 Pa. 65; Bayle v. P. R. T. Co., 286 Pa. 536; Lyles v. P, R.
T. Co., 93 Pa. Super Ct. 290; Gannon v. Wilson, 18 W. N. C. 7.
82209 Pa. 398.
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And in McNerney v. Reading3 the reason given was:
"It was an act of the municipality and in effect a
declaration by it that the public safety required that
openings in pavements should be properly guarded."34
Here too, the violation of the ordinance must be the




1. Under the statutes prohibiting the selling of fire-arms
to minors and statutes prohibiting the employment of
infants in a dangerous occupation, the violation of the
statutory duty is negligence per se. Further, the viola-
tion is treated as the proximate cause of the injury.
Contributory negligence or assumption of risk will not
bar recovery.
2. Statutes creating definite duties as to traffic regula-
tions or general safety regulations in mining, manu-
facturing, or buildings are mandatory and the viola-
tion is negligence per se but the proximate cause must
be established before the violation will be actionable.
Contributory negligence will bar recovery but assump-
tion of risk will not.
Ordinances
1. The mere violation of an ordinance is some evidence of
negligence to be treated with the other evidence. The
violation must be the proximate cause and, a fortiori,
contributory negligence will bar recovery.
Howard M. Kuehner.
INTEREST OF BOROUGH COUNCILMEN IN
BOROUGH CONTRACTS
The recent Act of June 9, 1931, P.L. 386, sec. 13, re-
emphasizes the problem of a borough councilman's inter-
831S0 Pa. 611.
34See also Bunis v. Pa. R. R. Co., 210 Pa. 94.
85215 Pa. 287
202
